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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 002576

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR
DRL
S/CRS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT FOR DS/IP/WHA
DS/DSS/ITA
DSERCC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2014

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [ASEC](#) [HA](#) [MINUSTAH](#)

SUBJECT: RELATIONS AMONG MINUSTAH, HNP LEADERS NO
IMPEDIMENT TO ACTION

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Timothy M. Carney, reasons 1.4 (B) and
(D)

1. (C) Summary: MINUSTAH and HNP command rotations have injected a new set of personalities into top-level security decision-making in Haiti: Incoming MINUSTAH military forces commander Bacellar is more thoughtful and methodical than the excitable former General Heleno; UNPOL Commissioner Muir is more outgoing but less operationally assertive than former Commissioner Beer; and Haitian National Police Director General Andresol is more effective and dependable than former DG Charles. Relations between the three new commanders have developed unevenly. Muir and Andresol are close partners while Bacellar, although cordial with both, has limited his personal and professional ties to the other two. Although the lack of rapport between Bacellar and Muir/Andresol has affected the character of joint missions, it does not seem to have encroached on operational success, although Bacellar remains reticent to take on Cite Soleil. Mutual trust at the top between UNPOL and HNP is a promising development, though both forces still struggle to put their strategic plans into action. End summary.

2. (C) Andresol told Poloffs October 7 that he did not yet have a close relationship with Bacellar. He said they had collaborated on occasion for joint missions and briefings, but that Bacellar did not seek his counsel or cooperation often. The DG said he would welcome more contact with the General, but he recognized that MINUSTAH increasingly preferred to conduct military operations without HNP assistance (as in the recent effort to capture General Toutou in Gran Ravine) in order to protect secrecy. He added that the HNP stood ready to hold the ground in Cite Soleil whenever MINUSTAH decided to move in.

3. (C) In contrast, Andresol said that he meets frequently with Muir and that the two work as a team on many topics. Poloffs have participated on several meetings jointly chaired by Muir and Andresol and Muir has become a fixture in HNP internal planning sessions. Muir told Poloffs October 10 that his relationship with the DG has only improved with time. While UNPOL co-location with the HNP in the field remains disappointing, co-management in key divisions (Judicial Police, SWAT, training) and joint command of special operations is increasingly entrenched. Muir and Andresol both claim to share a common vision for the development of the HNP and are struggling only in their ability to command their respective forces to make the vision a reality.

4. (C) Sources close to Bacellar report that there is no bad blood between Muir and Bacellar, but rather different mandates and management styles. Operationally, as MINUSTAH has more fully deployed and the security situation is no longer red hot, targeted military incursions are increasingly carried out by MINUSTAH military alone, freeing UNPOL to return to its original mandate of assisting the HNP with police field training. Stylistically, Muir is fond of planning and strategy while Bacellar tends to focus on operational detail and implementation, the sources said. As a result, Muir's preference for flowcharts and focus on strategic planning has had an impact on joint military-UNPOL operations. An UNPOL regional commander told Poloff that Muir's relative inexperience and weakness operationally has allowed Bacellar to take control on the ground of joint operations. Whereas under former Commissioner Beer joint maneuvers were regularly co-commanded on equal terms by UNPOL and military commanders, Bacellar's officers have asserted greater control while Muir has ceded it. In practice, the shift in relative power does not seem to have had a detrimental effect on morale or mission efficacy, and some MINUSTAH sources say the unified command is an improvement.

Comment

15. (C) Bacellar has not sought the counsel or friendship of either Muir or Andresol (or apparently anyone else), and clearly he prefers not to share control of operations that have a predominant military component. The General maintains an effective if aloof professional relationship with both. The limited rapport between Bacellar and the others has not impeded operational effectiveness and is an improvement over the testy and erratic bond displayed between General Heleno and DG Leon Charles. Regardless of the Bacellar's attitude, MINUSTAH military forces have visibly improved their performance on the ground (Cite Soleil excepted).

16. (C) Meanwhile, Muir and Andresol have an amiable personal connection and work together far more closely (and more often) than Leon Charles did with Commissioner Dave Beer. Although UNPOL does not yet have officers in every HNP station, joint operations between UNPOL and HNP are more numerous and successful than before. But the success is due in large part to internal improvements in the HNP and a more normalized UNPOL deployment rather than Muir-Andresol camaraderie. Andresol has made good on pledges to crack down on kidnappings, arrest corrupt officers, cleanse the ranks of the top brass, and conduct internal investigations. After two months Muir has focused more on planning than implementation. His weakness is already apparent and is likely responsible for Bacellar's preference to go it alone and/or remain in charge of joint military/UNPOL operations. Our own USG police reform program requires UNPOL cooperation, and while we too enjoy friendly relations with Muir, we have been stymied thus far by his focus on organizational structure rather than execution. End comment.

CARNEY